To this end, the judicial power,
under the Constitution of the United States, was made coextensive with
the legislative power. It was extended to all cases arising under the
Constitution and the laws of Congress. The judiciary became thus
possessed of the authority of deciding, in the last resort, in all cases
of alleged interference, between State laws and the Constitution and
laws of Congress.
Gentlemen, this is the actual Constitution, this is the law of the land.
There may be those who think it unnecessary, or who would prefer a
different mode of deciding such questions. But this is the established
mode, and, till it be altered, the courts can no more decline their duty
on these occasions than on other occasions. But can any reasonable man
doubt the expediency of this provision, or suggest a better? Is it not
absolutely essential to the peace of the country that this power should
exist somewhere? Where can it exist, better than where it now does
exist? The national judiciary is the common tribunal of the whole
country. It is organized by the common authority, and its places filled
by the common agent. This is a plain and practical provision. It was
framed by no bunglers, nor by any wild theorists. And who can say that
it has failed? Who can find substantial fault with its operation or its
results? The great question is, whether we shall provide for the
peaceable decision of cases of collision. Shall they be decided by law,
or by force? Shall the decisions be decisions of peace, or decisions of
war?
On the occasion which has given rise to this meeting, the proposition
contended for in opposition to the doctrine just stated was that every
State, under certain supposed exigencies, and in certain supposed cases,
might decide for itself, and act for itself, and oppose its own force to
the execution of the laws.
Pages:
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916