The advantage of these fortifications and of an augmented naval
force in the extent contemplated, in a point of economy, has been
fully illustrated by a report of the Board of Engineers and Naval
Commissioners lately communicated to Congress, by which it appears
that in an invasion by 20,000 men, with a correspondent naval
force, in a campaign of six months only, the whole expense of the
construction of the works would be defrayed by the difference in
the sum necessary to maintain the force which would be adequate to
our defense with the aid of those works and that which would be
incurred without them. The reason of this difference is obvious.
If fortifications are judiciously placed on our great inlets, as
distant from our cities as circumstances will permit, they will
form the only points of attack, and the enemy will be detained
there by a small regular force a sufficient time to enable our
militia to collect and repair to that on which the attack is made.
A force adequate to the enemy, collected at that single point,
with suitable preparation for such others as might be menaced, is
all that would be requisite. But if there were no fortifications,
then the enemy might go where he pleased, and, changing his
position and sailing from place to place, our force must be called
out and spread in vast numbers along the whole coast and on both
sides of every bay and river as high up in each as it might be
navigable for ships of war.
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