To strengthen this argument no demand had either been made from
those in command of the Fleet or from commanders of our Armies
for airships to act as auxiliaries to our forces.
The disasters experienced by all early airships and most
particularly by the Zeppelins were always seized upon by those
who desired to convince the country what unstable craft they
were, and however safe in the air they might be were always
liable to be wrecked when landing in anything but fine weather.
Those who might have sunk their money in airship building
thereupon patted themselves upon the back and rejoiced that they
had been so far-seeing as to avoid being engaged upon such a
profitless industry.
Finally, all in authority were agreed to adopt the policy of
letting other countries buy their experience and to profit from
it at a later date. Had the war been postponed for another
twenty years all might have been well, and we should have reaped
the benefit, but most calamitously for ourselves it arrived when
we were utterly unprepared, and having, as we repeat, only three
airships of any military value.
With these three ships, Astra-Torres (No. 3), Parseval (No. 4)
and Beta, the Navy did all that was possible. At the very
outbreak of war scouting trips were made out into the North Sea
beyond the mouth of the Thames by the Astra and Parseval, and
both these ships patrolled the Channel during the passage of the
Expeditionary Force.
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